TítuloLogics for Non-Cooperative Games with Expectations
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2013
AuthorsGodo L, Marchioni E
Conference NameEleventh European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems (EUMAS 2013)
Volume1113
EditionEmiliano Lorini
EditorialCEUR-WS.org
Conference LocationToulouse (France)
Paginación82-96
Date Published12/12/2013
Resumen

We introduce the logics E(G) for reasoning about probabilistic expectation over classes G of games with discrete polynomial payoff functions represented by finite-valued Lukasiewicz formulas and provide completeness and complexity results. In addition, we introduce a new class of games where players' expected payoff functions are encoded by E(G)-formulas. In these games each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations over an outcome as well as their own. We offer a logical and computational characterisation of this new class of games.

URLhttp://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1113/paper7.pdf